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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of board diversity and CEO educational background 
on bank performance. Based on a sample of 54 UK publicly listed banks over the 
period 2005–2015, we examine the relationship of both static and dynamic modelling 
frameworks, which controls for individual specific effects and potential sources of 
endogeneity. The study reports a positive but insignificant relationship between CEO 
education and bank performance, and a positive significant association between gender 
diversity and bank performance. It further denotes a negative and significant impact of 
nationality diversity on bank performance. Our findings provide empirical support for 
the significance of the association between board diversity and firm performance. Our 
study also provides support for theories concerned with how corporate governance 
differs in financial institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the new global economy, corporate governance has become a key is-
sue for financial institutions. However, the global financial crisis caused 
losses and closures for a massive number of financial firms with the large 
part of the blame being directed at the governance of these institutions. 
This led governments worldwide to pay attention to the importance 
of governance for financial services providers and banks in particular 
(Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). The bank board is an essential part of corpon-
rate governance, which has a vital role in determining the bank’s finan-
cial behavior and reactions to complex situations. Moreover, other stake-
holders do not have the board’s ability to impose the proper and effective 
governance in banks (Levine, 2004). Prior studies have considered board 
diversity to be one of the major issues among board characteristics that 
affect financial firms decisions and investments (Oxelheim & Randoy, 
2003; Veltrop et al., 2015). In addition, educational background seems to 
be a fundamental asset of a new CEO in the appointment decision for a 
bank or other financial firm (King et al., 2016).
Indeed, Levine (2004) attributed the complicated governance system in 
banks to the ambiguous nature of banks, and a number of factors such 
as the quality of supervision, regulation level, bank environment, and 
the nature of banks’ assets (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O’Hara, 
2016; Sherif & Anwar, 2016). For example, Bai and Elyasiani (2013) 
claim that the traditional governance standards of the non-financial 
institutions are no longer reliable when applied in the banking system, 
which has different stability requirements. This motivates us to 
investigate the effect of CEO educational background and the effect of 
gender and nationality diversity on bank financial performance. Our 
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research is unique because much less is known about how banks should be managed inside the board 
room, which is not common in the literature. One of the reasons also to study UK banks is justified 
by the high percentage of female representation in listed companies in contrast to many jurisdictions 
(Sherif & Anwar, 2016; Shehata et al., 2017).
This paper has several contributions to the literature. First, it provides direct evidence on the relation-
ship between board diversity and firm performance within the UK banks and provides more insights 
to research concerned with how financial institutions should be managed. In addition, it has been no-
ticed that the financial sector would benefit from further studies that focus on increasing the efficiency 
of monitoring and enhancement of financial firms’ governance. Second, the banks’ different charac-
teristics and the banking environment make it more interesting to study the effect of the diversity on 
the Board of Directors (BoD) and CEO educational backgrounds in the UK banks. To the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the relationship between bank performance, CEO 
education, and nationality diversity on the BoD in the UK. 
The study findings suggest a significant positive association between gender diversity on BoD and bank’s 
performance, an insignificant impact of the foreign members on the BoD and bank’s performance, 
and a positive significant impact of CEO’s business education on the financial performance of banks. 
Therefore, this study makes a major contribution to research on bank governance by demonstrating 
how different constituents of bank boards can affect the performance of the bank and recommending 
governments and policymakers to pay more attention to board members and CEOs education in order 
to guarantee a strong financial system.
In this research, the authors aim to provide answers to several questions. First, does it matter to have 
gender diversity in the boardroom of UK banks? Second, do foreign directors meet board’s expectations 
in the UK banks? Third, does it matter to invest more in board member’s education? Finally, do the re-
sults vary when using more than one performance measure?
The remainder of the paper includes an analytical review for the previous studies in the first section, de-
tails on the models and methods in the second section, data and empirical findings in the third section, 
summary and conclusion in the last section.
1. THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND
As previously mentioned in the introduction, a 
significant number of financial firms collapsed 
or just survived by their governments’ interven-
tion because of the 2007–2008 global financial 
crisis (Erkens et al., 2012; Sherif & Anwar, 2016). 
Although some firms were affected much more 
than others, such failure required political inter-
ventions from governments of the affected econo-
mies all over the world (Taylor, 2009). This led the 
Basel Committee with its responsibility toward 
banking supervision to emphasize the importance 
of understanding how banks should be managed 
inside the board room and promoting corporate 
governance in banks (Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). 
Underpinning this, a robust governance system 
increases monitoring efficiency and guarantees a 
trusted financial system with a good reputation, 
which aids the whole country’s economic develop-
ment (Basel Committee, 2010). Consequently, the 
Board of Directors (BoD) must perform various 
functions such as providing information to subor-
dinates, engage managers in monitoring and con-
trolling, link the organization to the external sur-
rounding environment and monitor compliance 
with legalities from rules and regulations (Garcia-
Meca et al., 2015).
A large body of theory from economics, resource 
dependence, human behavior and social psychol-
ogy provides deep understanding to the relation-
ship between firm’s performance and board of di-
rector’s functions (Carter et al., 2010). For example, 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), is cone-
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sidered as a branch of financial economics that is 
mainly premised on the latent conflict between 
management and owners. This conflict empha-
sizes our need for a strong governance mecha-
nism to monitor and control firm’s activities 
(Wagana, 2016). Carter et al. (2003) also imply 
that, having members with varied skills and ex-
periences in a well-balanced diverse board can 
help in achieving better monitoring for manag-
er’s performance. Moreover, the proper balance 
of boards (comprised of representations from 
different backgrounds) prevents individuals 
and groups with common special interests from 
dominating the process on the making and tak-
ing of decisions. Conversely, Carter et al. (2010) 
argue that although agency theory supports the 
importance of board diversity in increasing and 
improving the board’s independence, it does not 
contend a robust support for the relationship 
between board diversity and a firm’s financial 
outcome compared to other theories such as re-
source dependence theory.
Corporations are not separate entities but exist 
in an environment which is linked to and reacts 
with the surrounding opportunities and threats. 
Resource dependence theory (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978) argues that organizations should gain the 
benefit of available resources from information 
and expertise in the environment and gain 
support from important groups or organizations 
in the external context. Lawal (2012) also claims 
creating a firm legitimacy in the environment 
from building communication channels is of 
importance to the firm.
In this context, Hillman et al. (2002) consider 
board of directors as vital part of the organizational 
resources for each firm through using their external 
networks and individual relationships to attract 
important needed resources, which helps the firm 
to compete. Additionally, a well-diversified board 
can assist firms in gaining different information 
and wider exposure to the environment from 
suppliers, customers, policymakers, as well as 
social groups and competitors. Moreover, it 
reduces the transaction costs that firms may bear 
in accessing such information. Subsequently, 
under resource dependence theory, firms with 
diverse board members are expected to have 
superior performance.
With regard to human capital theory, it has been 
reported that the person’s experience, skills and 
education shape his character, affect his decision-
making process and can be used to generate 
benefits for an organization (Becker, 1964). The 
existence of different genders and nationalities 
within the board leads to unique human capital, 
which is expected to affect the firm performance 
(Nielsen & Huse, 2010b). However, Terjesen et al. 
(2009) contend that, although women on BoD have 
the same level of qualifications as men in terms of 
education they are less likely to gain experience 
faster due to tokenism that may exist on the board 
and hinder women’s contributions.
Under the theory of human capital and consistent 
with contingency theory (Fiedler, 1964) the 
effect of board diversity on the firm is positive or 
negative according to the type of firm and time 
circumstances. Consistently, social psychological 
theory claims that differences in gender, 
nationalities and education provide a diversified 
stock of skills, information, and opinions, which 
add value to the critical thinking and decision-
making on one hand, but can also lead to more 
time-consuming conflict, which negatively 
affects the effectiveness on the other (Campbell 
& Minguez-Vera, 2008). While Westphal and 
Milton (2000) believe, divergent thinking may 
be encouraged due to having different groups 
in the board room. Social psychological theory 
thus views board diversity has both positive and 
negative impacts on firm performance. Indeed, 
the relationship between CEO education, diversity 
on BoD and firms’ performance has attracted the 
attention of scholars to investigate the nature of 
the association between these variables and how 
this affects policymakers when making decisions 
regarding hiring a CEO or the acquisition of a new 
board member.
1.1. CEO education
One of the key corporate board roles is to select a 
superior Chief Executive Officer (CEO) with out-
standing capabilities. In this regard, CEO ability 
is considered a combination of sensible charac-
teristics such as previous work experience, career 
reputation history and education; non-observ-
able characteristics such as leadership ability, ac-
quiring board members and shareholders trust 
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and teambuilding skills. However, measuring 
the non-quantifiable characteristics and skills of 
CEOs empirically is a major challenge (Falato et 
al., 2015). A measurable and objective characterc-
istic such as education is expected to play a vital 
role when hiring the CEO, especially when the 
stock market reacts positively to the companies 
that appoint CEOs with stronger educational 
backgrounds (Bhagat et al., 2010). In addition to 
education being an important factor in the CEOs 
hiring process, those with advanced degrees are 
also expected to have higher compensation treat-
ment compared to their peers with less advanced 
educational credentials (Graham et al., 2012). In 
this line, Falato et al. (2015) document reliable 
evidence of payment for CEO educational cre-
dentials, reporting a positive effect of CEO with 
more advanced education on the company per-
formance. Further, Miller et al. (2015) argue that 
CEO skills are dependent on the nature of aca-
demic qualifications, which vary in accordance 
to quality and level of the awarding educational 
institution.
However, the empirical evidence regarding CEO 
education is not yet consistent. For example, 
Gottesman and Morey (2010) found no associa-
tion between firm performance and CEO educa-
tional background. Moreover, a wave of studies 
argue that a firm’s outstanding performance is 
a reflection of the company position and CEO 
qualification not education (see for example, 
Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Gottesman & Morey, 2010). 
Interestingly, these findings are contradictory to 
some recent studies that prove a positive asso-
ciation between CEO education and corporate 
performance. For example, Jalbert et al. (2002) 
indicate that CEOs without a college degree can 
earn more profits than those CEO’s holding de-
grees. Similarly, Gottesman and Morey (2010) 
claim no relationship between CEO’s education-
al background and firm’s financial performance.
In another study, Barker and Mueller (2002) ren-
port that younger CEO’s with advanced science 
education, such as engineering, are more likely 
to invest much money in research and develop-
ment, implying that the educational background 
affects CEO’s investment decisions. However, 
they also report an insignificant relationship be-
tween advanced degrees such as MBA or PhD 
and firm performance. With regards to CEOs 
with MBA degree, they are less likely to en-
gage in risky decisions, as risk-taking skills are 
found to be related to age more than the level 
of manager education (King et al., 2016). In ade-
dition, executives with PhD degrees are also as-
sociated with low portfolio risk in comparison 
to others (Barker & Mueller, 2002; Berger et al., 
2014). Conversely, Beber and Fabbri (2012) indi -
cate that firms with a CEO that holds an MBA 
degree and has less prior work experience, is 
shown to speculate more due to CEO’s overcon-
fidence. King et al. (2016) support education and 
its impact on CEOs’ performance implying that 
banks led by CEOs with higher MBA scores are 
more likely to achieve better levels of bank prof-
itability compared statistically to banks headed 
by CEOs without a MBA degree. Nevertheless, 
in the risk context, CEOs with an MBA make 
riskier and innovative decisions to secure supe-
rior bank performance.
To conclude, two empirically proven sugges-
tions exist; one supports the view that educa-
tion delivers skills that enable CEOs to manage 
banks, make proper decisions in complex situa-
tions, and to achieve better outcomes. The other 
suggests that there is no significant evidence on 
the impact of CEO education level or quality on 
bank financial performance. Indeed, mixed evi-
dences for the impact of CEO education on firm 
performance are found. Due to this conflict a 
null hypothesis is identified as follows:
H1: CEO educational background has no impact 
on the bank performance.
1.2. Board diversity
Increasingly, the composition of the board of di-
rectors in terms of nationality and gender diver-
sity have become critical issues for policymakers 
in many countries. Here, some governments have 
established sets of rule guidelines for board diver-
sity, however, it is not obvious how and whether 
these guidelines or policies will achieve the de-
sired outcomes (Garcia-Meca et al., 2015). In this 
study, therefore, the authors bridge this gap and 
provide insights to policymakers through investi-
gating the impact of diversity among members in 
the board room.
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1.2.1. Gender diversity
Gender diversity and bank performance have 
blurred and indecisive relationship that makes 
this topic subject to future research. Prior research 
suggests a positive association between the two 
factors; however, another strand of research plain-
ly find the opposite or conclude no evidence on the 
relationship between both of them.
In this line, Zelechowski and Bilimoria (2004) 
find that, although women as board directors 
have sufficient managerial and human skills, 
good communications, rules and regulations 
awareness, and public relations skills, they are 
not well represented in board rooms compared 
to men. Furthermore, Upadhyay and Zeng 
(2014) demonstrate that female members on the 
board present different points of view in board 
discussions, which help in promoting the board 
decisions in a more transparent information 
environment due to diversity. Elsewhere, Dezso 
and Ross (2012) report that having women in the 
top level of management improves the performance 
of firms that have an innovation-focused strategy, 
indicating that it is important for a firm to take 
the social and informational benefits of different 
genders into consideration. Similarly, Nielsen and 
Huse (2010a) find that women have a positive effect 
on increasing the board development activities 
and decreasing the level of conflict, which helps in 
maintaining a strong strategic control.
With regard to the risk perspective, Hutchinson 
et al. (2015) support that greater gender diversity 
reduces firm excessive risk and improves financial 
performance. The higher the proportion of 
women in top management jobs, the higher 
the firm’s financial performance (Smith et al., 
2006). This is supported by Liu et al. (2014) who 
document that boards with three female directors 
or more strongly affect firm performance more 
than those with two or less female directors. 
Additionally, they provide evidence of Chinese 
regulators that female directors have more legal 
control. Elsewhere, Minguez and Campbell (2007) 
suggest that investors do not punish Spanish firms 
for acquiring female board members, calming 
that such gender diversity helps in generating 
economic gains. In contrast, other research 
reported a negative association between corporate 
performance and gender diversity on the BoD. For 
example, Haslam et al. (2010, p. 22), who claim 
that companies, where the majority of directors 
are women, found weak performance, which leads 
to a devaluation of companies by investors. In 
another study, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find 
that firms with high diversity level among their 
boards are more likely to pay more incentives, 
have more board meetings, and suffer from the 
negative operating performance.
Smith et al. (2006) indicate that the higher 
performance associated with the significant 
presentation of women in Danish companies 
is due to their qualifications rather than their 
gender. Similarly, Carter et al. (2010) report 
an insignificant relationship between gender 
diversity and US firm performance implying that 
ethnic and gender diversity should be considered 
as key endogenous factors. Likewise, Marinova et 
al. (2016) report an insignificant relation between 
firm performance and board diversity. Gregory-
Smith et al. (2014) also find no evidence for the 
idea that higher percentage of females on BoD can 
affect the UK corporate performance. Similarly, 
Brammer et al. (2007) suggest that gender diversity 
on BoD is less possibly to affect the performance 
of UK companies.
Equiped with the above review, it is evident that 
such studies have relied on a cross-sectional 
analysis, which limits the outcome of analyzing 
the relationship between firm performance 
and diversity on the BoD. Reflecting on the 
previous studies in this area, it is evident that 
further examination of the relationship between 
board gender diversity and bank performance is 
necessary as each of these studies present mixed 
findings. As such our second hypothesis considers:
H2: Gender diversity has no impact on the bank 
performance.
1.2.2. National diversity
The nationality of directors is another element of 
board diversity that requires consideration. While 
some prior studies report no evidence or a negative 
impact of a foreign director as a board member, a 
few other studies support that spreading the idea 
of businesses’ internationalization highlights the 
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need for directors with key knowledge and in-
ternational communications, which aids the net-
working of the firm in other countries. For ex-
ample, Carpenter et al. (2001) provide evidence 
of international CEOs producing outstanding 
performance in the USA. Furthermore, diversity 
on boards is argued to help in increasing the pool 
of active foreign investors and reduce the number 
of domestic shareholders. This arguably improves 
firm performance through efficient utilization of 
capital and productive labor (Fogel et al., 2013).
Examining firm size, industry type, and board 
size, Carter et al. (2003) find a significant posi0-
tive relationship between the presence of foreign-
ers and ethnic minorities on board of directors. 
Likewise, Oxelheim and Randy (2003) indicate 
that importing outsider board members can en-
hance the international orientation of firms list-
ed in Sweden or Norway. Additionally, they ar-
gue that foreign members have a positive impact 
on exchange-traded firms. Elsewhere, the work 
of Choi et al. (2007) using a sample of 457 firms, 
also indicates that foreign directors have a sig-
nificant positive effect on the firm performance 
in Korea.
Moreover, some studies on board diversity con-
clude that foreign directors are less likely to have 
affiliations from gaining shareholders or consul-
tation. This is because a foreigner board member 
faces a significant closed domestic network with 
low experience, which makes it difficult for him/
her to add significant contributions to board de-
cisions. Additionally, conflicts between foreign 
and domestic members affect decision speed and 
communication in the board room (Ruigrok et 
al., 2007). Similarly, Masulis et al. (2012) highlight 
that foreign directors are not familiar enough 
with national laws and regulations, and normal 
domestic management methods, implying that 
foreign board members have significant weak per-
formance. In contrast, they also highlight that the 
stock market has a negative reaction toward the 
announcement of a foreign independent director 
appointment. Indeed, the work of Douma et al. 
(2006) indicates that the overrated performance 
of foreign directors is considered a justification for 
the reported negative relationship between foreign 
directors and Indian firms’ Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: Nationality diversity has no impact on the 
bank performance.
Finally, a number of studies support the contention 
that nationality plays an important role in bank per-
formance (Carpenter et al., 2001; Fogel et al., 2013; 
Oxelheim & Randoy, 2003). In contrast, Douma et al. 
(2006), Ruigrok et al. (2007), and Masulis et al. (2012) 
report a negative effect of different nationalities be-
tween board members on the firm performance. 
Accordingly, with conflicting empirical evidence, it 
is difficult to determine the impact of foreigners on 
the bank board. 
Another strand of previous research found that 
gender diversity has a positive effect on corporate 
performance (Bart & McQueen, 2013; Campbell 
& Mnguez-Vera, 2008; Garcia-Meca et al., 2015; 
Hutchinson et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014; Zelechowski 
& Bilimoria, 2004). However, another group of stud-
ies found a negative effect of gender diversity on the 
firm performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Smith et 
al., 2006). For example, Carter et al. (2010), Gregory-
Smith et al. (2014), Marinova et al. (2016) found no 
association between gender diversity on the BoD and 
corporate financial performance. Such contradicting 
results motivate us to investigate the impact of gen-
der diversity on banks.
Furthermore, although education is considered as a 
key factor that affects board member decisions and 
participation in the board room (Bhagat et al., 2010; 
Falato et al., 2015; Graham et al., 2012; King et al., 
2016; Miller et al., 2015), the empirical evidence on 
board education is not yet to consistent or compre-
hensive. While recent studies document a positive 
association between CEO education and corporate 
performance, other research found no relationship 
between firm performance and CEO educational 
background. They claimed that a firm’s outstanding 
performance is a reflection of the company position 
and CEO qualification rather than education (Barker 
& Mueller, 2002; Beber & Fabbri, 2012; Gottesman & 
Morey, 2010; Jalbert et al., 2002). Consequently, there 
are two contradicting findings that provide different 
empirical evidences regarding the influence of CEO 
educational background on the firm’s performance. 
This, indeed makes discovering, understanding, and 
analyzing the relationship between level, quality, and 
type of education, and bank performance a more 
stimulating topic.
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2. MODELS AND 
METHODOLOGY
The analysis in this study is based on the employed 
regression model, which has the following 
functional form:
( ) ,
it it it
it it it it it
GEN NAT EDU
BKPF
COT lnTA ETA FC
α β β β
β ε
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =  + ⋅ ++ + 
 
(1)
where i  is the bank ID number (1-56), t  denotes 
the time period (2005–2015); BKPF refers to the 
bank performance measures used in the study 
which should be one of TQ, ROAA, ROAE, NIM. 
GEN is the gender diversity variable, which rep-
resents the females’ proportion on the BoD. NAT 
refers to the Nationality diversity measure, which 
denotes the percentage of foreigners in the board 
room for each bank in each given year. EDU is a 
dummy variable, equals 1 when the bank’s CEO 
has a business educational background and 0 if 
the CEO is coming from non-business education-
al background. CONT refers to the study control 
variables, which are total equity to total assets ra-
tio, bank size measured by the ln  of total assets, 
and financial crisis.
Our study illustrates how employing a variety of 
methodologies can affect the empirical results that 
are used to analyze banks performance. A pooled 
regression is firstly estimated in which neither the 
unobservable heterogeneity nor the endogeneity of 
board diversity and CEO education is firstly con-
sidered. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is simply 
used to estimate the pooled model. OLS is more 
applicable if there is no existence for time or indi-
vidual firm-specific effects, but if they exist, then 
the unobserved effects of time or individual spe-
cific effects are accommodated by using a panel 
data technique (Boulouta, 2013; Fogel et al., 2013). 
In panel data, there are the static and the dynamic 
models. Clark and Linzer (2015) suggested that the 
independent variables are fixed and do not change 
over time under the fixed effect model, whilst the 
independent variables are assumed to be random 
and vary over time in the random effect model, 
and the independent variable and the effect units 
are uncorrelated. Moreover, the study estimates 
the dynamic data model to overcome the static 
model assumption denoting that all independent 
variables are exogenous (Adams & Mehran, 2012). 
3. DATA AND  
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
3.1. Data
The sample used in this study consists of 535 
observations for the publicly listed banks in the 
UK. Annual panel data are adopted and span the 
period 2005–2015. The bank assets, equity, and 
the financial measures were obtained from Bank 
Scope database and annual reports, while board 
diversity (gender and nationality diversity) data 
were drawn from Fame, Bank Scope, and Boardex 
databases. CEO education data were mainly 
obtained from Boardex database. The initial 
sample comprises the whole population, but due 
to data availability, only banks with detailed data 
on each bank CEO educational background and 
the percentage of females and foreign directors for 
each year are selected.
Alternative market and accounting based ratios 
are used to measure bank performance, namely 
Tobin’s Q (TQ), Return on Average Assets 
(ROAA), Return on Average Equity (ROAE), and 
Net Interest Margin (NIM). For board diversity 
measurements, the female proportion (GEN) on 
BoD is used to find the impact of female members 
on the bank performance, while for nationality 
diversity, the foreign directors’ effect on banks 
performance is measured using the foreigners’ 
proportion among the board members (NAT). The 
control variables include bank size represented in 
total assets (lnTA), the percentage of bank equity 
to total assets (ETA), and financial crisis (FC) as a 
dummy variable which equals 1 during the years 
of crisis and 0 otherwise.
3.2.  Empirical findings 
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics  
and correlation matrix
Our analysis begins with reporting the descriptive 
statistics. Table 1 reports the summary statistics 
for all data during the study period. The market-
based variable Tobin’s Q (TQ) is primary used as a 
measure of bank performance. The mean of Tobin’s 
Q of our sample is 0.598 which is less than 1.05 the 
average TQ of Adams and Mehran (2012) study. It 
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is lower also than Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) and 
Pathan and Fa’s (2013) work where both reported 
1.1 as TQ mean in their studies. For accounting-
based performance measurements, our findings 
report higher mean values for ROAA, ROAE, and 
NIM compared to previous studies. However, for 
foreign directors and female representation on the 
board Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) report reduced 
averages compared to our study. While Liang et 
al. (2013) reported 0.11 as a mean value for the 
females’ proportion on the BoD, which is closer to 
our result, they also reported a very low percentage 
(0.06) for foreign directors in Chinese banks.
Table 1 represents the correlation between 
the dependent and independent variables. 
Notably, this correlation matrix shows that 
there are significant relationships between the 
majority of the selected variables of the study 
and the performance measurements. Any 
multicollinearity among the performance 
measures (dependent variables) does not affect 
our results simply because four different models 
are employed; one for each different measure. 
More specifically, it is clear there are negative 
relationships between the existence of foreign 
directors and all measures except NIM, these 
results are consistent with previous studies. 
However, this Table 1 also shows the positive 
correlation between having female directors inside 
the board and all bank performance measures. 
The bank size (total assets) is negatively correlated 
with three out of four performance measures 
which are in line with Adams and Mehran (2012). 
For CEO’s educational background, it is found 
that a significant positive correlation with banks 
TQ, ROAA, and NIM, while an insignificant 
association with the bank ROAE is found. This 
matrix also reports a negative relationship 
between the foreign directors’ percentage and 
the CEOs with business educational background 
among the board of directors, implying CEOs 
with a good level of experience in business studies 
prefer to deal with English directors from the UK 
than foreign directors. It is also shown that the 
CEO with business education can easily work 
with female directors, but this is an insignificant 
finding.
Table 1. Summary statistics and cross-correlation 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Performance measures:
TQ 0.598 0.385 0.01 3.05 495
ROAA 5.108 11.422 –49.2 48.18 535
ROAE 10.429 15.484 –65.820 58.84 535
NIM 5.756 26.213 –80 300 527
Board diversity and CEO education:
NAT 0.205 0.223 0 0.878 594
GEN 0.173 0.107 0 0.429 594
EDU 0.722 0.448 0 1 594
Control variables:
In TA 14.185 2.774 10.008 21.599 535
ETA 56.692 37.003 .930 100 535
FC .182 .386 0 1 594
Variables NAT GEN EDU InTA ETA TQ ROAA ROAE NIM
NAT 1.000 – – – – – – – –
GEN 0.029 1.000 – – – – – – –
EDU –0.401 0.023 1.000 – – – – – –
InTA 0.420 0.249 –0.463 1.000 – – – – –
ETA –0.537 –0.074 0.435 –0.697 1.000 – – – –
TQ –0.430 0.013 0.430 –0.605 0.651 1.000 – – –
ROAA –0.169 –0.000 0.124 –0.160 0.248 0.302 1.000 – –
ROAE –0.002 0.030 0.027 0.012 –0.123 0.166 0.833 1.000 –
NIM 0.096 0.039 0.134 –0.160 0.007 0.203 0.033 0.078 1.000
285
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 15, Issue 1, 2018
3.2.2.  OLS and panel data models estimates
Table 2 shows the pooled OLS estimates results 
which explain the role of gender and nationality 
diversity and CEO educational background on banks 
performance (Tobin’s Q, ROAA, ROAE, and NIM). 
The females’ percentage on the BoD has positive 
impact on all performance measures, but it has the 
highest significance level (0.01 level of significance) 
at TQ (β = 0:879), this is consistent with Garcia-
Meca et al. (2015), who found that female directors 
have remarkable performance and can enhance the 
board decisions. Although the proportion of female 
representation is positively correlated to ROAA 
(ββ = 5:387) and ROAE (β = 5:496), it is insignificant, 
but it significantly affects (at .05 level of significance) 
the bank NIM (β = 21:42). These results are in line 
with Dezso and Ross (2012), Hutchinson et al. (2015), 
Liu et al. (2014), and Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) who 
emphasized how having female directors on the BoD 
is important and reported the positive impact of their 
efforts on the corporate performance. These results 
are consistent with Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1978) 
resource dependency theory and by supporting 
the argument that different directors with different 
perspectives are considered as valuable resources 
for any organization. However, these results are 
contradicting with Haslam et al. (2010), Smith 
et al. (2006) who suggest more focus on women 
qualification; not just being women. Likewise, 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) found a negative effect of 
mandating the gender proportion on US firms board 
and the performance of these firms.
From Table 2, the findings depict a negative 
significant association between TQ and ROAA 
and the foreign directors’ percentage on the 
BoD. Although different significance levels are 
maintained, the highest one (at 0.05 significance 
level) assigned with TQ (β = 0:300), indicates that 
foreign directors on the BoD negatively affect banks 
performance in the UK, which is in line with Garcia-
Meca et al. (2015) who also reported a negative effect 
of foreign minorities in different markets. Berger et 
al. (2014), and Gottesman and Morey (2010) also 
suggest that foreign board members are less likely 
to outperform other national members. In addition, 
our results contrast with Oxelheim and Randoy 
(2003), who support that maintaining different 
nationalities within the board may enhance firm 
performance.
It is important for board members and directors 
to enhance their business education level, which 
will increase their chance to be nominated or 
selected for a CEO position. These results prove 
that appointing a CEO with a business educational 
background has a positive significant impact on 
the bank’s TQ (β = 0:101) and NIM (β = 8:978). 
Although the other accounting-based measures 
ROAA and ROAE report an insignificant effect of 
CEO education on bank performance, they show 
a positive relationship between the both variables. 
Our results are consistent with the evidence of 
Falato et al. (2015) in supporting higher pay for 
CEO with high business educational credentials 
and the argument of Gottesman and Morey 
(2010) who reported no association between 
CEO education and firm financial performance. 
Regarding the control variables, it is clear that 
the bank size has a negative relationship with the 
firm performance represented in TQ, ROAA, and 
NIM which is confirming the results of Adams 
and Mehran’s (2012) study. This also supports the 
argument that a large portion of the bank assets 
is allocated for loans which increases the firm’s 
risk. As such the significant negative relationship 
between bank assets and its market performance 
represented in TQ (β = 0:0464) could be logically 
accepted. In contrast, the accounting-based 
measure of performance ROAA reports a positive 
but insignificant relationship with the bank size 
which partially agrees with Garcia-Meca et al. 
(2015) who reported a positive but significant 
effect of bank size on its ROAA. Thus, the financial 
crisis has a significant negative effect on bank 
performance under all measures, which is in line 
with previous studies that measured the impact of 
financial crisis on firms performance.
To enhance the study results the robust OLS 
regression is applied using a new control vari-
able, bank equity, which is a widely used control 
variable in various empirical studies that inves-
tigate the effect of board characteristics on cor-
porate performance such as Adams and Mehran 
(2012)’s work and Pathan and Faff (2013). The 
results in Table 3 demonstrate that the females’ 
proportion on the BoD still has a significant 
positive association with bank market-based 
performance (TQ). The relationship between the 
foreign directors’ percentage and bank perfor-
mance is also found to be negative but insignif-
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icant. CEO educational background affects the 
bank performance significantly and positively 
as represented in TQ (0.0779) and NIM (9.603). 
There are no changes while measuring the effect 
of the financial crisis on bank performance, as 
the results are still reporting a significant nega-
tive effect of the financial crisis on both market 
and accounting-based performance measures. 
The new control variable, bank equity, appears to 
have a significant positive effect on both TQ and 
ROAA and a negative effect on ROAE, which is 
statistically logical when the total equity increas-
es and the return remains the same or does not 
increase with the same level of total equity, this 
will reflect a reduction of banks ROAE.
To control for heterogeneity across banks, an al-
ternative technique is employed in the form of 
fixed and random effects of panel data regression 
as laid out in Table 4, according to Hausman test 
(p = 0.2197), the random effects model is applied. 
They present less significant results implying 
that although there is a positive impact of gen-
der diversity and CEO education on bank per-
formance, they are no longer highly correlated 
relationships except for the significant positive 
effect of gender diversity on bank NIM (at .05 
significance level) under the fixed effect model. 
Regarding the foreign directors, a negative but 
insignificant relationship between the foreign 
directors’ percentage and the performance mea-
sures except NIM is evident, which comes in line 
with Fogel et al. (2013), Carpenter et al. (2001) 
and Carter et al. (2003). However, the financial 
crisis period shows a significant negative rela-
tionship with the UK listed banks performance 
proving that the global financial downturn has 
a negative effect also on the UK. Likewise, bank 
size still has a negative significant relationship 
with banks performance under the random ef-
fect model, which supports the previous results 
of the OLS model. The relationship between the 
ETA and bank financial performance is positive 
but insignificant under the FE model and signifi-
cant under the RE model except with ROAE as 
previously shown.
Table 2. OLS model estimates
Variable (Model 1)TQ
(Model 2)
ROAA
(Model 3)
ROAE
(Model 4)
NIM
GEN 0.879*** 5.387 5.496 21.420*
NAT –0.300*** –6.236* 0.186 33.010***
EDU 0.101** 0.735 1.530 8.978**
lnTA –0.074*** –0.480* 0.091 –2.185***
FC –0.112*** –8.368*** –10.890*** –1.304
–cons 1.487*** 13.120*** 8.950* 20.410**
R2 0.473 0.112 0.067 0.077
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
Table 3. Robust OLS model estimates
Variable (Model 1)TQ
(Model 2)
ROAA
(Model 3)
ROAE
(Model 4)
NIM
GEN 0.758*** 3.051 9.802 26.14**
NAT –0.133 2.938 5.893 27.45*
EDU 0.078** 0.443 0.443 9.603***
lnTA 0.046*** 0.0430 0.873* –3.186***
ETA 0.004*** 0.068*** 0.125*** 0.126**
FC 0.105*** 8.211*** 11.180*** –1.556
–cons 0.907*** 1.844 29.74*** 41.57***
R2 0.523 0.131 0.104 0.089
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
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3.2.3. Fama – MacBeth model
To strengthen the results associated with OLS 
and the static panel data fixed and random effect 
model, Fama and MacBeth (1973) is employed as 
a robustness check of our findings. Similar results 
are provided in Table 6 to our previous analysis 
confirming the positive significant relationships 
between the proportion of females on the BoD 
and bank performance, as well as supporting the 
positive significant effect of the CEO educational 
background on bank performance in the UK. 
However, this test also reports a negative and 
insignificant association between foreign members 
on the board and the bank performance. Overall, it 
is found that a similar pattern of results confirming 
that additional tests can improve the statistical 
significance level and direction of the results.
3.2.4. Quantile regression
To overcome the OLS drawbacks such as producing 
the conditional mean and specifying one estimate 
for the relationship between the bank performance 
measures and each independent variable (Hallock 
et al., 2010), the quantile regression model is em -
ployed to estimate different relations of board di-
versity variables and CEO education across the 
conditional distribution of performance measures 
(Sula, 2011).
Table 6 depicts estimates which are consistent 
with the previous models estimates. It shows a 
significant positive association between females’ 
proportion on the BoD and bank performance 
measured by TQ and NIM. What stands out in 
the table is the negative significant relationship be-
tween percentage of women on BoD and the bank 
TQ, which confirms the robustness of our find-
ings. Conversely, Table 7 provides a positive but 
insignificant impact of CEO education and bank 
performance. It is also shown that bank size has a 
negative significant impact on bank performance, 
bank equity plays a key role in improving the per-
formance, and the financial crisis has its negative 
impact on the UK bank.
Table 4. Random effect model estimates
Variable (Model 1)TQ
(Model 2)
ROAA
(Model 3)
ROAE
(Model 4)
NIM
GEN 0.180 3.051 9.437 23.55**
NAT –0.147 –2.938 –5.117 58.43**
EDU 0.137 0.443 2.166 10.80
lnTA –0.006 0.043 –0.758 –1.857
ETA 0.006*** 0.068*** –0.114*** 0.160
FC –0.096*** –8.211*** –11.16*** 0.234
–cons 0.311 1.844 27.37*** 0.704
R2 0.413 0.112 0.076 0.085
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
Table 5. Fama – MacBeth model estimates
Variable (Model 1)  TQ
(Model 2)  
ROAA
(Model 3)  
ROAE
(Model 4)  
NIM
GEN 0.722*** 3.189 8.788 25.10***
NAT –0.123 –2.507 –4.584 20.90*
EDU 0.089** 0.567 2.442 8.825***
lnTA –0.048*** –0.007 –0.896* –2.939***
ETA 0.004*** 0.065 –0.128* –0.130***
–cons 0.900 0.978 27.91*** 39.46***
R2 0.564 0.205 0.099 0.091
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
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CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the relationship between board gender diversity, nationality diversity, CEO 
educational background and bank financial performance using data of listed banks in the UK. It 
measures the bank performance using both market-based measure (TQ) and accounting-based 
measures (ROAA, ROAE, and NIM). Various econometrics techniques including OLS, static panel 
data models and the Fama and MacBeth (1973) test are used. Using a sample of 54 listed banks 
in the UK market with 535 observations over the study period from 2005 to 2015, our findings 
conclude that employing different econometric techniques besides more than one performance 
measure can provide different results at least on the level of significance for the study variables 
relationships.
Our analysis finds that board diversity and CEO education do matter with respect to bank gover-
nance and that it affects its financial performance. With respect to board diversity, our evidence 
indicates a positive association between female proportion on the BoD and the firm’s financial 
performance measured by both accounting-based and market-based measures. Additionally, this 
study highlights that boards which contain a foreign minority in their directors may face domestic 
barriers such as awareness of the industry regulation or the overall work performance which may 
make them less likely to have a positive effect on the decision-making process. It also recommends 
that government and policymakers in the UK should give more attention to CEO educational back-
ground and check that candidates have a proper business education which will enable them to 
enhance decision making and guarantee a strong financial system. It also reports a negative rela-
tionship between the bank size represented in its total assets and the bank financial performance. 
While it is evident that UK banks have been affected throughout the financial crisis period, the 
findings also suggest that the bank capital plays a significant positive role in improving bank fi-
nancial performance. 
This research provides both an academic and practical implications. It contributes to research con-
cerned with how financial institutions should be managed following the Basel committee advice which 
called for more research in bank governance field. It also gives insights to policymakers in the UK bank-
ing industry on appointing a new board member or a bank CEO. It also encourages CEOs, directors 
and mangers to improve their educational capabilities to enhance their decision-making. Overall, this 
research helps in enhancing banks understanding in relation to the development of a corporate gover-
nance mechanism.
Table 6. Quantile regression model estimates
Variable (Model 1) TQ (Model 2) ROAA (Model 3) ROAE (Model 4) NIM
GEN 0.262*** 2.275 5.478 4.661**
NAT –0.120** –0.636 –6.198 –0.612
EDU 0.0257 0.105 0.140 0.361
lnTA 0.0203** –0.140 –0.878** –0.336***
ETA 0.007*** 0.083*** –0.125*** –0.241***
FC –0.039* –0.966 –8.121*** 0.0478
–cons 0.435*** 2.736 32.11*** 7.325***
R2 0.526 0.156 0.052 0.013
Notes: p-values in parentheses ***0.01, **0.05, *0.1.
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